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Abstract
The paper empirically investigates, in the context of African countries, the determinants of
income distribution and inequality, the effect of inequality on economic growth, and the
channels through which inequality affects growth. Data for 35 countries over different
periods in the last four decades were employed. Factors identified as having affected
income distribution include the level of economic development attained, regional factors,
size of government budget and the amount of it devoted to subsidies and transfers, phase of
economic cycle, share of agricultural sector in total labour force, as well as human and
land resources endowment. Some evidence that high inequality reduces growth is also
found. The channels through which inequality affect growth are found to be through
reduction in secondary and tertiary education investment, reduction in political stability,
and increase in fertility rate. There is, however, no evidence that it affects private saving
and investment or the size of government expenditure and taxation, contrary to what is
contended in the theoretical literature.
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1. Introduction
Empirical studies on income inequality have been addressing two issues: identification of
factors responsible for an observed pattern and magnitude of inequality and the direction—
whether negative or positive—of the effect of inequality on economic growth. However,
contradictory findings have often been reported, partly because of limited guidance
provided by the theory. In addition, most of such studies have been based on cross-country
(sometimes, panel) data for a particular region or for all countries with available data. But,
because of limited number of income distribution data points for African countries, hardly
any studies have been reported exclusively for Africa and, in those cases where all
countries with available data are included, the number of African countries covered often
constitutes a negligible fraction of the total.
There is a need not only to shed more light on the existing contradiction-prone evidence,
but also to examine the subject from an African perspective. The use of African data is
supported not only by the relatively low level of development and high level of poverty in
the region, but also because of the recent renaissance there to fight poverty, which makes
Africa-specific evidence of immediate relevance to anti-poverty policies. The present study
addresses the aforementioned two aspects, viz: factors accounting for the observed income
inequality and the direct and indirect effects of the inequality on economic growth and it is
based on cross-country (or, rather, quasi-panel) data for 35 African countries spanning the
1960s to 1990s.
The rest of the paper is organized into 6 sections. Section 2 is on literature review while
section 3 presents an overview of the data. In section 4, the methodology adopted in
carrying out the study is discussed. The empirical results on determinants of inequality are
presented and discussed in section 5 and the same is done in section 6 for the effects of
inequality on growth. Section 7 provides a summary and some conclusions.
2. Earlier literature
2.1 Factors determining income inequality
A number of empirical studies have tried to explain income distribution or inequality from
various standpoints. Some studies, and mainly those based on time series data, are often
pre-occupied with determining the effects of selected macroeconomic variables (such as
inflation and unemployment level) on income distribution, e.g. Mocan (1999) and Blejer
and Guererro (1990), while some other time-series studies examine the effects of fiscal
policy, especially tax rate, on inequality, e.g. Auten and Carroll (1999) and Feenberg and
Poterba (1993). As such studies have been reported mainly for developed countries with
adequate time series on income distribution, they are not very applicable to the present
cross-country study.
Because of the limited number of time series observations for a single country, particularly
for developing countries, most empirical studies have been based on multi-country data
sets and the range of potential determinants of income distribution being tested is wider.
Studies based on multi-country data have been encouraged recently through maintenance2
of multi-country income distribution ‘data banks’, as pioneered by Deininger and Squire
(1996) and subsequently widened by WIDER and UNDP. Some of these focus on testing a
specific propositions, e.g. Mushinski (2001) and Thornton (2001) who examined whether
the Kuznets’ hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and the level
of development is supported by data. Others examine the effects of some specific
institutional and economic factors on income distribution. For instance, Li et al. (2000)
examine the effect of corruption; Tanninen (1999) tests for the effect of government
expenditure; while Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) examine the effects of dualism,
especially as it relates to agriculture.
Furthermore a number of studies have attempted to examine the effects of a broad range of
factors on inequality, within a multi-country setting. Such factors are a combination of the
aforementioned ones such as government spending, dualism, level of development, etc.
Some of these studies include Deininger and Squire (1998), Vanhoudt (2000), and Barro
(2000). It is this last category of multi-country studies that is most relevant to the present
paper. Specifically, we test for the effect of a fairly wide range of factors on income
distribution, as discussed subsequently.
2.2 Effects of income inequality on economic growth
Theoretical background
Initially, the conventional wisdom in the literature was that income inequality promotes
economic growth. This view was premised on Keynes’ idea that average propensity to save
increases with income level so that, by redistributing income in favour of the rich, the
economy-wide average propensity to save and, hence ceteris paribus the fraction of GDP
devoted to capital formation would rise, thereby promoting economic growth.
While not necessarily refuting the above channel of effect of inequality on growth, at least
four other channels that point to a negative effect of inequality on growth have been
identified in the more recent literature. These channels, the details of which are discussed
by Perotti (1996), Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Garcia-Penalosa (1999), are as follows:
· Through endogenous fiscal policy or political economy. It has been contended, e.g. by
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Bertola (1993), that a high level of inequality leads to
redistributive fiscal policy in the form of higher government expenditure and
distortionary taxation which, in turn, are believed to retard growth. This is based on the
assumption that political power (e.g. one-person-one-vote in a democratic setting) is
more equally distributed than economic power. The poor normally benefit more from a
given government expenditure than they lose via the taxes levied on them to finance
that expenditure, whereas the opposite is the case for the rich. It follows that the level
of expenditure and taxation preferred by each voter would vary inversely with their
income level. Hence the greater the amount by which the mean income in an economy
exceeds the median income (i.e. the greater the degree of inequality) the more likely it
would be that the redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor would be
supported by majority voting (i.e. by the median voter).
· Through credit market imperfections for financing investment in education.
Theoretical expositions underlining this channel include those presented by Galor and3
Zeira (1993) and Piketty (1997). In a nutshell, the proponents contend that there are
borrowing constraints facing the poor in financing education and, hence, in
accumulating human capital. This induces poor households to forgo human capital
investments, even if the investments offer very high rates of return. The greater the
degree of wealth and income inequality, the greater the number of people for which the
constraints would be binding and, therefore, the lower is the stock of human capital in
the economy. Economic growth is presumed to be enhanced through human capital
accumulation. It should be noted that the effect of this channel would be weaker if
education is being financed by the state or is made compulsory, as in the case of
primary schooling in some countries.
· Through sociopolitical unrest and instability. A number of theoretical frameworks, e.g.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), have been developed,
showing the likely negative effect of high inequality on economic growth through
increased crime, social unrest and political instability that high inequality tends to
cause.
· Through endogenous fertility. It has been contended by Perotti (1996) that high
inequality, by increasing the fertility rate in an economy, serves to retard the rate of
economic growth. A more formal theoretical exposition of this has also been provided
by Morand (1999). According to this line of reasoning, there is a poverty trap or
threshold below which there exists high fertility rate (say, motivated by old-age
support), in preference to the alternative of investment in children’s education; i.e.
quantity of children is preferred to quality. Above the threshold, the reverse is the case.
By increasing the number of people living below the threshold, high inequality would
increase the economy-wide fertility rate and thereby reduce economic growth.
Empirical evidence
The problem arising from the theoretical expositions, as reviewed above, is the existence
of contradictory predictions. The older view predicts a positive effect of high inequality on
growth (through increase in saving and investment) while the more recent view predicts a
negative one, through a combination of the aforementioned four channels.
At the empirical level, the contradiction persists. While some studies, e.g. Perotti (1996)
and those summarized in Benabou (1996, Table 2), report findings that broadly support
negative effect of inequality on growth, others like Li and Zou (1998) have reported
findings to the contrary. More recently, Barro (2000) has presented evidence that tends to
‘reconcile’ them by showing that ‘negative effect of inequality on growth shows up for
poor countries but that the relationship for rich countries is positive’. But this
‘reconciliation’ is still far from convincing and the present study, which is based almost
exclusively on data for poor countries, attempts to shed additional light on the issue.4
3. Income distribution data and their correlations
3.1 Income distribution data
The income distribution data employed in the present study are shown in Table 1. In the
first four columns, economy-wide data (i.e. data for combined rural and urban areas) for all
the 35 countries are shown. Some of these countries have more than one data point each
(with Morocco having a maximum of four) so that there are 65 data points in total. The
basic source of the data is the joint WIDER/UNDP World Income Inequality Database
(internet) that was, in turn, compiled from a number of sources, including Deininger and
Squire (1996). This source is augmented by the World Bank’s World Development Report
(various issues), whose income distribution contents greatly overlaps with the
WIDER/UNDP source.
While there are more observations reported in the above sources than are presented in
Table 1, we have had to be discriminating in our selection. In particular, we avoided
including observations that are based on surveys of less than national coverage (e.g. those
only based on income tax returns or national accounts or for rural or urban areas only);
where there is no clear reference to the primary source; and for any other qualifications
that might have made the data sources (particularly, WIDER/UNDP source) not to have
included them in their ‘high quality’ category. Also, for each country having more than one
data point, we exclude observations for consecutive years and, in general, we make sure
that the ‘time series’ for a country are some years apart. Barring measurement errors,
income distribution statistics are not expected to change markedly between two successive
years.
The last eight columns of Table 1 contain income distribution data that are separately
analyzed into rural and urban categories. The data, which are available for only 22
(exclusively sub-Saharan) countries (four of which have two data points each, making
26 observations altogether), are from the World Bank’s African Development Indicators
(various issues).1 Most of the data relate to households (as opposed to individuals) as the
recipient units. They also mostly refer to expenditures, rather than incomes. This is
particularly the case with those 26 data points that have separate rural and urban
disaggregation, as shown in Table 1.
The raw data derived from the sources are the income or expenditure shares of the five
population quintiles (i.e. population ordered according to income or expenditure level, at
intervals of 20 percent). We add the income/expenditure shares of the lowest two quintiles
to arrive at the income share of the 40 percent poorest of the population and do the same
for the shares of the next two lowest quintiles to arrive at the share of the next poorest 40
percent (that corresponds to the so-called ‘middle class’, following Perotti, 1996) while the
Gini coefficient is computed from the five quintile shares in the usual manner.2
1The economy-wide (or combined rural and urban) equivalents are already contained in the aforementioned
WIDER/UNDP/World Bank sources, as presented in the first four columns.
2 This implies assumption that all members of a quintile receive equal amounts has to be made so that the
formula for calculating Gini coefficient becomes: Gini = 0.8-1.6Q1-1.2Q2-0.8Q3 –0.4Q4,w h e r eQ 1,Q2,Q3,a n d
Q4are the shares of the first (i.e., poorest), second, third and fourth quintiles respectively (Barro, 2000, p. 15).5
As it can be seen from the last eight columns of Table 1, both the income share of the
richest 20 percent of the population and the Gini coefficient are higher for urban areas than
for rural areas, except in the case of Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Niger,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia ( i.e. except in 7 out of 26 data points). This means that,
generally, income inequality is higher in the urban areas in sub-Saharan countries than in
rural areas there. This observation agrees with the premise or assumption on which
Kuznets’ (1955) hypothesis concerning the inverted U-shaped relationship between
inequality and level of economic development was based.3
It should be noted that the degree of inequality varies directly with the Gini coefficient and the income share
of richest 20 percent of the population while it varies inversely with the income shares of the poorest 40
percent and, to a less extent, of the ‘middle class’.
3 According to Kuznets’ model, the agricultural and rural sectors are characterized with relatively low level
of per capita income and low level of inequality. He posited that the initial phase of economic development
process entails shrinking of these sectors through movement of resources (especially, workers) from them to
the industrial and urban sectors that both feature higher inequality and higher level of per capita income,
thereby establishing a positive relationship between the economy-wide level of per capita income and
inequality at the early stages of development. In due course, the new workers who joined the industry and
urban area would move up the income ladder vis-à-vis the existing richer workers there and, at the same time,
scarcity of workers in the agriculture and rural area would drive up wages there too, thereby reducing
inequality in the whole economy. This means that as the level of per capita income increases further, a
negative relationship between income and inequality would be established.6
Table 1
Income Distribution Data



















Algeria, 1988 0.178 0.357 0.465 0.357 … … … … … … … …
Algeria. 1995 0.186 0.388 0.426 0.329 … … … … … … … …
Botswana, 1986 0.105 0.306 0.589 0.492 … … … … … … … …
Burk. Faso, 1994 0.142 0.307 0.550 0.437 0.185 0.354 0.461 0.347 0.139 0.351 0.511 0.418
Burundi, 1992 0.200 0.384 0.416 0.310 … … … … … … … …
C. Afr. Rep.,1993 0.069 0.281 0.650 0.558 0.080 0.250 0.670 0.559 0.110 0.341 0.549 0.466
C. d’Ivoire, 1985 0.158 0.368 0.474 0.381 … … … … … … … …
C. d’Ivoire, 1988 0.180 0.380 0.441 0.341 … … … … … … … …
C. d’Ivoire, 1995 0.183 0.375 0.443 0.339 0.212 0.403 0.385 0.284 0.181 0.366 0.453 0.347
Djibouti, 1996 0.178 0.373 0.449 0.349 0.172 0.382 0.446 0.355 0.178 0.372 0.450 0.348
Egypt, 1974 0.165 0.355 0.480 0.378 … … … … … … … …
Egypt, 1991 0.212 0.377 0.411 0.295 … … … … … … … …
Egypt, 1995 0.230 0.380 0.390 0.266 … … … … … … … …
Ethiopia, 1995 0.180 0.343 0.477 0.360 0.200 0.361 0.439 0.321 0.143 0.312 0.545 0.432
Gabon, 1975 0.093 0.272 0.635 0.522 … … … … … … … …
Gabon, 1977 0.075 0.262 0.663 0.555 … … … … … … … …
Gambia, 1992 0.134 0.339 0.528 0.432 0.178 0.406 0.416 0.331 0.158 0.337 0.505 0.396
Ghana, 1988 0.186 0.382 0.432 0.332 … … … … … … … …
Ghana, 1992 0.199 0.379 0.422 0.314 0.201 0.380 0.419 0.311 0.191 0.372 0.437 0.329
Ghana, 1997 0.206 0.377 0.417 0.305 0.227 0.384 0.390 0.270 0.197 0.396 0.407 0.308
Guinea, 1991 0.113 0.385 0.502 0.440 0.120 0.405 0.475 0.419 0.114 0.383 0.502 0.436
Guinea, 1994 0.168 0.360 0.472 0.370 0.201 0.391 0.408 0.305 0.175 0.362 0.463 0.358
Guinea-Bis.,1991 0.086 0.326 0.589 0.510 0.080 0.316 0.604 0.525 0.129 0.350 0.522 0.435
Kenya, 1992 0.101 0.277 0.621 0.512 0.170 0.396 0.434 0.347 0.139 0.326 0.535 0.431
Kenya, 1994 0.147 0.351 0.502 0.406 … … … … … … … …
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Lesotho, 1987 0.093 0.306 0.601 0.510 … … … … … … … …
Madagascar, 993 0.145 0.334 0.521 0.419 0.165 0.362 0.472 0.374 0.142 0.346 0.512 0.416
Malawi, 1968 0.215 0.279 0.506 0.336 … … … … … … … …
Mali, 1994 0.126 0.312 0.562 0.458 0.159 0.345 0.495 0.391 0.158 0.342 0.501 0.395
Mauritania, 1988 0.139 0.392 0.465 0.398 … … … … … … … …
Mauritania, 1995 0.170 0.374 0.456 0.360 0.197 0.398 0.406 0.308 0.194 0.384 0.422 0.320
Mauritius, 1980 0.165 0.436 0.399 0.321 … … … … … … … …
Mauritius, 1986 0.172 0.371 0.457 0.362 … … … … … … … …
Mauritius, 1991 0.183 0.383 0.434 0.338 … … … … … … … …
Morocco, 1965 0.145 0.201 0.654 0.486 … … … … … … … …
Morocco, 1985 0.228 0.378 0.394 0.270 … … … … … … … …
Morocco, 1991 0.171 0.367 0.463 0.361 … … … … … … … …
Morocco, 1999 0.171 0.361 0.466 0.366 … … … … … … … …
Mozambique., 1996 0.173 0.362 0.465 0.361 … … … … … … … …
Niger, 1992 0.193 0.366 0.441 0.330 0.096 0.368 0.536 0.473 0.170 0.379 0.451 0.358
Niger, 1995 0.097 0.370 0.533 0.470 … … … … … … … …
Nigeria,, 1986 0.192 0.366 0.442 0.331 … … … … … … … …
Nigeria, 1993 0.129 0.378 0.494 0.420 0.138 0.335 0.527 0.428 0.183 0.386 0.431 0.334
Nigeria, 1997 0.126 0.318 0.557 0.454 … … … … … … … …
Rwanda, 1984 0.229 0.381 0.391 0.268 … … … … … … … …
Senegal, 1991 0.105 0.316 0.579 0.487 0.143 0.381 0.476 0.400 0.153 0.319 0.528 0.417
Senegal, 1995 0.167 0.351 0.482 0.376 0.218 0.391 0.391 0.280 0.186 0.350 0.464 0.347
S. Leone, 1968 0.053 0.327 0.620 0.550 … … … … … … … …
S. Leone, 1990 0.031 0.335 0.634 0.585 0.026 0.174 0.790 0.670 0.099 0.379 0.521 0.462
South Afr., 1965 0.061 0.366 0.573 0.582 … … … … … … … …
South Afr., 1994 0.084 0.269 0.648 0.543 0.134 0.302 0.564 0.450 0.098 0.328 0.574 0.494
Sudan, 1968 0.165 0.376 0.460 0.336 … … … … … … … …
Swaziland, 1994 0.085 0.271 0.644 0.539 0.118 0.331 0.550 0.459 0.068 0.274 0.658 0.563
Tanzania, 1964 0.126 0.264 0.610 0.480 … … … … … … … …
Tanzania, 1969 0.099 0.308 0.593 0.501 … … … … … … … …
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Tanzania, 1993 0.178 0.367 0.455 0.352 0.198 0.387 0.415 0.311 0.177 0.362 0.461 0.355
Tunisia, 1965 0.157 0.353 0.490 0.388 … … … … … … … …
Tunisia, 1971 0.107 0.244 0.649 0.514 … … … … … … … …
Tunisia, 1990 0.163 0.374 0.463 0.370 … … … … … … … …
Uganda, 1989 0.206 0.375 0.419 0.305 … … … … … … … …
Uganda, 1993 0.175 0.365 0.461 0.357 0.193 0.386 0.421 0.323 0.153 0.339 0.508 0.403
Zambia, 1976 0.112 0.322 0.566 0.473 … … … … … … … …
Zambia, 1993 0.119 0.376 0.504 0.486 0.137 0.359 0.504 0.418 0.168 0.365 0.468 0.369
Zambia, 1996 0.124 0.329 0.548 0.451 0.134 0.329 0.537 0.434 0.142 0.328 0.530 0.426
Zimbabwe, 1990 0.103 0.274 0.623 0.511 … … … … … … … …
Mean value .147 .343 .510 .409 … … … … … … … …
Coef. of variation .318 .131 .158 .208 … … … … … … … …
Source: as discussed in the text.
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3.2 Correlation of income distribution and economic growth with other variables
The simple correlation coefficients of the income distribution variables and economic
growth with other variables of interest are reported in Table 2. From the Table, it can be
seen that the Gini coefficient is highly correlated with the income share of poorest 40
percent of the population and that of richest 20 percent, with correlation coefficients of –
0.972 and 0.967 respectively. The negative correlation between the income shares of the
poorest 40 percent and the richest 20 percent is also very high, being –0.887. The high
correlation between the income distribution variables and the size of arable land per capita
is also noteworthy.
Table 2
























Gini Coefficient 1.000 -.972 -.729 .967 -.090
Income share of the poorest 40% -.972 1.000 .557 -.887 .127
Income share of the next poorest 40% -.729 .557 1.000 -.877 -.028
Income share of the richest 20% -.967 -.887 -.877 1.000 -.059
5-year average economic (per capita GDP)
growth
-.090 .127 -.028 -.059 1.000
Real per capita income level .148 -.148 -.092 .136 -.081
Govt. expenditure/GDP ratio .226 -.210 -.231 .238 -.044
Govt. subsidies/GDP ratio -.236 .188 .305 -.262 .260
Govt. subsidies/govt. total expenditure ratio -.232 .179 .328 -.268 .278
5-year average inflation rate .016 -.041 .127 -.045 -.122
Economic cycle (expansion) indicator -.174 .153 .198 -.187 .106
Degree of openness of economy—
(export+import)/GDP
.110 -.139 .037 .060 -.032
Percent of total labour force in agric. sector .088 -.064 -.148 .119 -.174
Indicator of control on corruption .020 .042 -.213 .086 .212
Size of arable land per capita .475 -.469 -.291 .432 -.072
Illiteracy rate -.103 .121 -.022 -.059 -.054
Share of govt. consumption in GDP .115 -.103 -.132 .131 -.056
Fertility rate .122 -.095 -.167 .148 -.088
Private saving/GDP ratio -.143 .166 .034 -.115 .256
Private investment/GDP ratio .238 -.212 -.295 .274 -.204
table continues…10
Primary school enrolment ratio -.006 .026 -.017 -.005 -.062
Secondary school enrolment ratio -.149 .124 .205 -.185 -.034
Tertiary school enrolment ratio -.136 .120 .182 -.170 -.077
Tax revenue/GDP ratio .080 -.070 -.098 .087 .117
Index of political stability -.348 .352 .258 -.334 .118
5-year average population growth .108 -.066 -.187 .142 -.257
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) All variables, except 5-year average annual population growth rate, are for the period preceding the
5-year average annual per capita GDP growth. The following are in logarithms: real per capita income,
openness of economy, percent of labour force in agric, arable land per capita, illiteracy rate, fertility rate, and
school enrolment ratios.
4. Methodology
As already mentioned, the empirical study has two components. The first is the
identification of relevant determinants of inequality while the second is to test for the effect
of inequality on economic growth and the channels through which the effect is brought
about. Four alternative (or, rather, complementary) income distribution or inequality
indicators are considered separately. These are Gini coefficient and the shares of income
accruing to each the three income brackets (poorest 40 percent, next poorest 40 percent and
richest 20 percent). The Gini coefficient is considered because it is a useful summary
indicator of inequality. On the other hand, the poorest 40 percent roughly corresponds to
the population living below the relative poverty line, according to the World Bank's
African Development Indicators, from which a part of inequality data were sourced.4 This
is why we have identified this income bracket for analysis, so we can also make some
inference on the determinants of poverty. The shares of income accruing to the 40%
‘middle class’ and the richest 20 percent are also analyzed so as to ‘complete the picture’
and account for which income group benefits from the loss to the poorest 40 percent of the
population (i.e. those living below the relative poverty line). Each of these four measures
has been employed in previous studies of inequality.
To identify the factors determining income distribution in these countries, we specify
regression equations for each inequality variable and test for the effects of those factors
considered as possible determinants, along the line explained further in section 5. Also, to
test for their effects on economic growth, we include each of them (one at a time) as a
regressor in an economic (per capita real GDP) growth equation. Finally, to identify the
channels through which they may have affected economic growth (e.g. whether through
private saving, credit market imperfection, sociopolitical stability or fertility rate, as all
reviewed in section 2), we include each of them in equations specified for variables
proxying each of these channels, as further explained in section 6.
While there are two or more ‘time series’ income distribution observations for some of the
countries, most have only one observation each so that the cross-country data set can
hardly be described as a panel type. The data are more akin to ordinary cross-section data.
Hence, we consider panel data estimation technique to be inapplicable and use only OLS.
4 For most countries, the fraction of population living below relative poverty line is between 40 and 50
percent, although there are some outliers with some below 30 percent and others above 60 percent.11
In order to correct for the possible existence of heteroscedasticity and to remove the effect
of outliers, we employ a robust and homoscedasticity-consistent estimating technique
proposed by White (1980).
Some of the variables are in growth rate form, expressed as average annual growth rate
over a number of years. The affected variables are per capita income growth (i.e. economic
growth), inflation rate (i.e. growth rate of the GDP deflator), population growth rate, and
the terms of trade growth rate. Each was computed as an average annual growth rate over
five years, through the OLS technique. For most of the other variables (e.g., those
expressed as ratios of GDP), a simple average over two or three successive years was
taken. The explanatory variables employed in the regression equations are normally for the
period preceding the observation years for the dependent variable, so as to minimize the
existence of simultaneity in some cases where the contemporaneous values of the
regressors might be prone to be endogenous. Most of the data (i.e., other than income
distribution statistics, whose sources have been discussed in section 3.1) were downloaded
from World Bank (internet) sources, including African Development Indicators. The only
exceptions are the terms of trade, private investment-GDP ratio and private saving-GDP
ratio that were sourced from (unpublished) IMF sources as well as the indicator of control
on corruption and index of political stability that both come from Kaufmann et al. (1999).
5. Empirical results on the determinants of income inequality
We consider a fairly wide range of possible determinants of income distribution, being
guided by previous empirical studies. We report below the outcomes for most of these
possible determinants. For brevity, in a number of cases where the results do not support a
significant influence of such factors, we do not report the results and simply make passing
references to them.
5.1 The level of economic development and regional factors
We tested for the Kuznets’ hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the level
of economic development (per capita income) and inequality in the early stage of
development while the relationship is reversed in a later stage (i.e. the inverted U-shape
relationship). But the hypothesis is not directly supported by the data.5 Hence, we do not
include the Kuznets’ variables in the reported estimates below. Instead, we feature only the
level of real per capita income in all the estimates reported and exclude the square of per
capita income. It is then found that per capita income level has positive coefficients
(statistically significant in many instances) in the inequality equations (i.e. for the Gini
coefficient and for the share of richest 20 percent in the population) while the opposite is
the case in the equality equations (i.e., for the shares of the poorest 40 percent and the
‘middle class’).6 This observed positive association between inequality and per capita
income level does not necessarily contradict Kuznets’ relationship if it is borne in mind
5 The hypothesis predicts that per capita income (say, in logarithms) and its square should respectively have
positive and negative statistically significant coefficients in an inequality equation. For the economic
rationale behind the hypothesis, see footnote 3.
6 For brevity, we shall henceforth be referring to equations for Gini coefficient and income share of the
richest 20 percent of the population as inequality equations while the equations for the shares of poorest 40
percent and the ‘middle class’ would be referred to as equality equations.12
that most of the countries covered by the study (at the various periods of income
distribution observations as shown earlier in Table 1) were probably still at the early stage
of development when only a positive relation between inequality and per capita income are
supposed to prevail.
We also include dummy variables for two regions in all the reported estimates. These are
the northern African region and eastern and southern African region.7 Casual observation
of the data suggests that inequality tends to be lower in the north African countries while it
tends to be above African average in the eastern and southern African countries—with the
latter being explainable by some historical factors, as in the case of South Africa. This
casual or informal inference from the statistics is actually supported by the formal analysis,
as reported below. The coefficients of northern Africa dummy variable are negative and (in
most cases) statistically significant in the inequality equations and positive in the equality
equations. The reverse is the case for the coefficients of eastern and southern Africa
dummy variable. Thus, the per capita income and these two regional dummy variables are
included in every equation, together with the specific variable(s) of interest.8
5.2 Effects of fiscal actions on inequality
As pointed out in section 2.1, some studies have attempted to evaluate the effect of
government spending on income distribution, e.g. Tanninen (1999), who presented mixed
findings on the matter. We too examine the issue by including the share of total
government expenditure in GDP as an argument in the income distribution equations. We
also take a step further by testing for the effects of government subsidies and transfers as a
ratio not only of GDP but also as a ratio of total government spending. The results are as
reported in Table 3.
As it can be seen from the table, the coefficients of the share of government spending in
GDP have statistically significant positive and negative coefficients in the inequality and
7 The dummy variable for northern Africa takes a value of unity for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
while the dummy variable for eastern and southern Africa takes a value of unity for Botswana, Burundi,
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
8 We do not include more regressors at a time, for at least two reasons. First, the number of observations is
limited and, second, missing values that do not overlap much characterize many of the regressors so that
including many of them simultaneously would substantially reduce the number of usable observations.13
equality equations respectively, indicating that a large size of government per se does not
appear to have reduced inequality in these countries but, in fact, appears to have done the
opposite; i.e. it appears to have aggravated the inequality. On the other hand, the
coefficients of the shares of subsidies in both the GDP and total government spending are
statistically significant and opposite in sign to those of government expenditure-GDP ratio.
This suggests that government subsidies and transfers appear to have been effective in
reducing inequality in these countries.9
9 This, however, does not necessarily imply that such subsidies and transfers were well targeted, as the size
of the subsidies and transfers may simply be a proxy for the totality of government commitment (in all
ramifications) to egalitarian income distribution.14
Table 3
Effects of government total expenditure and subsidies on income inequality

























































































































































































































2 .180 .183 .121 .172 .176 .137 .218 .204 .178 .141 .217 .206
Number of obs. 51 51 51 51 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The four dependent variables are the Gini coefficient; income share of the poorest 40 percent of the population; the next poorest 40 percent (‘middle class’); and
the richest 20 percent—as shown above. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent




Effects of inflation and phase of economic cycle on income inequality
Effects of Inflation Rate—all usable data
points
Effects of Phase of Economic Cycle—all
usable data points
Effects of Phase of Economic Cycle –data



























































































































































































2 .085 .108 .049 .061 .200 .189 .177 .211 .177 .136 .219 .209
Number of obs. 65 65 65 65 56 56 56 56 39 39 39 39
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The four dependent variables are the Gini Coefficient; Income share of the poorest 40 percent of the population; the next poorest 40 percent (‘middle class’); and
the richest 20 percent—as shown above. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5 percent and 1 percent significance
level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
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5.3 Effects of inflation and economic cycle on inequality
As reviewed in section 2.1, a number of studies (usually, time series) have examined the
effects of inflation rate and unemployment on income distribution, e.g. Mocan (1999) and
Blejer and Guerrero (1990). We too try to replicate this attempt within a cross-country
context. First, we include average annual inflation rate during 5-year preceding the income
distribution observation year as a regressor in the equations and the resulting estimates are
as reported in Table 4. Due to non-availability of statistics on unemployment rate, we are
unable to examine its effect directly. What we do instead is to construct a qualitative
variable that represents the phase of economic cycle a country was going through during
the income distribution observation year, following Mohtadi (1988). A value of unity is
assigned if the country was in the rising phase, minus unity if a declining phase and a zero
value if the evidence about the phase of cycle is ambiguous.10 This variable features in the
estimated equations and the results are also presented in Table 4, first for all usable data
points and then for data points for only 1990s so as to attest to the temporal stability of the
results. The inclusion of the variable is to determine which income group gains more
during rising phase of an economic cycle and loses more during the declining phase (that
sometimes characterizes the onset of adjustment or reform policies in these countries).
As it can be seen from the table, the coefficients of the inflation rate are statistically
insignificant in all cases, except in the equation for the share of ‘middle class’ where it is
positive and some weak significance is recorded. The overall evidence therefore suggests
that inflation rate does not appear to have contributed much to the observed income
distribution pattern in these countries. This finding is not necessarily counter-intuitive, not
just because most other cross-country studies have also not been able to report a clear
evidence of inflation effect on income inequality but also because the major distributional
effect of inflation, on an apriori basis, is believed to be on the distribution of wealth, as
opposed to the distribution of income. High inflation is expected to increase wealth
inequality, and not income inequality as such.
On the other hand, the coefficients of the qualitative variable that stands for the phase of
economic cycle are, at least, modestly significant in all equations and have negative values
in inequality equations and positive values in the equality equations. The results are similar
both for the entire set of (usable) observations and for the observations for only 1990s,
suggesting a temporal stability. Thus, the evidence is that the poorer segments of the
population lose more during the downturn of the economy and have to wait till the upturn
phase to make up for the earlier disproportionate losses. This has implications for
adjustment and reform policies which tend to bring about an initial downturn. This means
the poor would need to be adequately protected then (e.g., through poverty alleviation
measures), because of their disproportionate vulnerability.
10 Specifically, we regress the logarithm of real GDP during 12 years preceding the income distribution data
year against time trend. If the residuals corresponding to the last three of the 12 observations are all positive,
this is taken to mean that the country is going through the rising phase of a cycle so that the qualitative
variable is assigned a value of unity. If the residuals corresponding to the three years are all negative, it is
taken to mean that the country was going through the declining phase and the qualitative variable is assigned
a value of minus unity. Finally, if the residuals alternate between negative and positive, the evidence is taken
to be ambiguous and assigned a zero (neutral) value. This approach slightly refines that adopted by Mohtadi
(1988) by allowing for ambiguous cases.17
5.4 Effects of anti-corruption measures on inequality
Following in the footsteps of some previous studies (e.g. Li et al., 2000), we test for
whether the level of corruption (and, hence, policy efforts to reduce it) does have any
effect on income distribution. This is accomplished by including an index (reported in
Kaufmann et al., 1999) of control measures against corruption in the regression equations
and the resulting estimates are as presented in Table 5.
The coefficients of the index are not statistically significant except in the equation for the
income share of the ‘middle class’, where it is also negative. This suggests that the ‘middle
class’ benefits most from the existence of corruption at the expense of the other income
groups, so that it is the economic class that loses most through anti-corruption efforts.
However, this interpretation is tentative, as the results are not robust enough across all the
equations.
Table 5
Effects of corruption control on income inequality—data for 1990s only























































2 .229 .199 .234 .247
Number of obs. 34 34 34 34
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The four dependent variables are the Gini Coefficient; Income share of the poorest 40 percent of
the population; the next poorest 40 percent (‘middle class’); and the richest 20 percent—as shown above. (ii)
The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5 percent and 1
percent significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up
to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
5.5 Effects of openness of economy on inequality
Barro (2000: 27) sums up the propositions on the likely effects of international openness
thus:
From the perspective of standard trade theory, the effect of an opening to
international trade on income distribution depends on factor endowments…
Hence, this theory suggests that greater international openness would raise
inequality in rich countries and lower it in poor countries…. The standard
theory seems to conflict with the concerns expressed in the ongoing popular
debate about globalization. The general notion is that an expansion of18
international openness—including access to foreign technology and
culture—will benefit most the domestic residents who are already well of.
Following Barro (2000) and some other earlier studies, we subject these assertions to
empirical test by including the degree of international openness (defined as the sum of
merchandise exports and imports, in relation to GDP) as an argument in our regression
equations. The results are as reported in Table 6, from where it can be seen that none of its
coefficients is statistically significant. Thus the recent fear that increased globalization
would aggravate the existing inequality is not supported by this evidence and neither is the
standard prediction of trade theory.
Table 6
Effects of degree of openness and sectoral distribution of manpower on income
inequality











































































































































2 .086 .110 .022 .057 .120 .130 .092 .108
Number of obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The four dependent variables are the Gini Coefficient; Income share of the poorest 40 percent of
the population; the next poorest 40 percent (‘middle class’); and the richest 20 percent—as shown above. (ii)
Per capita income, openness of the economy, and the share of the agricultural sector in the total labour force
are in logarithms. (iii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At
10%, 5 percent and 1 percent significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-
value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
5.6 Effects of sectoral allocation of manpower on inequality
We also test for the effects of the share of agricultural sector in the total labour force on
income distribution by featuring it as an argument in our regression equations, following
the case made by Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) for inclusion of economic dualism in
income distribution relationships. The results are as reported in Table 6, from where it can19
be seen that this factor has an inequalizing effect. This is because its coefficients, which
are statistically significant in almost all cases, have positive values in the inequality
equations and negative values in the equality equations.
5.7 Effects of human and natural resource endowment on inequality
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) also made a strong case for the inclusion of resource
endowments as arguments in income distribution equations. Their empirical tests show that
the share of skilled workers in total labour force (which they proxied by lagged value of
secondary school enrolment ratio) and availability of land resources (proxied by arable
land per capita) exert significant income equalizing effects. We too test for the effects of
these factors by including arable land per capita and illiteracy rate (as a proxy for the non-
availability of skilled workers) in our equations. The results are reported in Table 7.
Table 7
Effects of human and natural resource endowment on income inequality—all usable
data points
Effects of Availability of Arable Land
per Capita







































































































































2 .243 .265 .068 .179 .107 .120 .079 .094
Number of obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The four dependent variables are the Gini Coefficient; Income share of the poorest 40% of the
population; the next poorest 40% (‘middle class’); and the richest 20%—as shown above. (ii) The numbers in
the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a
parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6
respectively.
Broadly in line with the findings of Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998), our results suggest
that a high level of illiteracy (and, hence, low level of skilled workers) exerts inequalizing
effects. This is because the coefficients for illiteracy (which are statistically significant in
half of the equations) are positive in the equations for Gini coefficient and the share of20
richest 20 percent of the population while they are negative in the equations for shares of
the poorest 40 percent and ‘middle class’.
However, our findings are in direct contrast to those reported by Bourguignon and
Morrisson when it comes to the effect of arable land per capita. Here, this proxy for
availability of land resources is found to exert unambiguous income unequalizing effects.
This is because its coefficients, which are statistically highly significant in all equations,
are positive in the inequality equations and negative in the equality equations. This also
accords with the evidence earlier presented in Table 2, where the simple correlation
coefficients between arable land per capita and income distribution measures are shown to
be very high. Possible explanations for this finding may need to await further future
studies. What we can only do in the meantime is to speculate that land distribution might
have been a major source of income inequality in many of these mostly agrarian countries
(see Deininger and Squire, 1998). Available evidence suggests that land distribution is
more unequal than income distribution in Africa (with the Gini coefficients for land
distribution averaging above 60 percent (Table 2, Deininger and Squire, 1998—in contrast
to 40.9 percent for income distribution as reported earlier in our own Table 1). This means
that the greater the availability of land (for a given land distribution pattern), the greater
should be its impact on income distribution and, hence, the greater the tendency for income
inequality to rise.
6. Empirical evidence of the effects of inequality on growth
6.1 Direct effect of inequality on growth
Evidence on the direct effect of inequality on growth is often inferred in the literature from
estimates of the reduced-form economic growth equations where income distribution
variables feature as some of the regressors. This same approach is adopted here.
Specifically, this is accomplished by estimating economic growth equations, with the
regressors being the income distribution variables as well as initial level of per capita real
GDP (in 1995 US $), 5-year population average annual growth rate and the share of
government consumption expenditure in GDP.11
For all the usable data points, the results are as presented in Table 8. The explanatory
power of the equations is very low, judging by the very low values of the adjusted R
2
square. Also, the coefficients of income distribution variables are all statistically
insignificant. Sensing that this poor fit could be due to the very long span of time (about 4
decades) covered by the data, we derived another set of estimates on the basis of more
recent data, which cover only 1990s, and the results are as presented in Table 9. These
11 Economic growth is measured as the average annual growth rate of per capita real GDP during 5 years
that follow the year of observation on income distribution. This means that the initial (i.e., in the year
preceding the 5-year growth of real GDP per capita) income distribution variables are the regressors so as
cater for any possibility of these regressors being endogenous in economic growth equations. For the same
reason, it is the initial value of the share of government consumption expenditure in GDP that is employed
and its coefficients are expected to be negatively signed, following previous empirical studies. Inclusion of
real income per capita is in line with the neoclassical growth theory and we expect its coefficients to be
negatively signed. We do not include the share of investment in GDP as a regressor so as not to control for
any effects of income distribution regressors on economic growth via capital formation.21
recent data-based estimates, though still short of high explanatory power, are a substantial
improvement on those reported in Table 8. Because separate income distribution data for
the rural and urban areas exist for a few countries in the 1990s, we are also able to derive
separate estimates of the effects of rural and urban income distribution pattern on
economic growth. These too are reported in Table 9.
Table 8




































































2 .049 .062 .039 .041
Number of observations 63 63 63 63
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the 5-year average per capita real GDP growth rate (ii) The numbers in
the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a
parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6
respectively.
In both Tables 8 and 9, the parameter estimates of Gini coefficient and the share of the
richest 20 percent of population are all negative and those of the share of the poorest 40
percent are all positive. In all cases, they are statistically highly significant only in respect
of the rural area regressions. The sign of the coefficient of the income share of ‘middle
class’, on the other hand, is mixed. It is positive and statistically significant in respect of
the rural area, while it is negative and insignificant in other cases. Notwithstanding the
mixed effect of the share of income accruing to the ‘middle class’, the preponderance or
balance of evidence is still that high income inequality retarded economic growth in these
countries and that the growth-retarding effect appears to have been higher in the case of
rural inequality.
6.2 Channels of the effects of inequality on growth
As noted in section 1, the traditionally held view on the channel of effect of inequality on
growth is through changes in private saving and capital formation, both of which are
supposed to be increased by high inequality, hence a positive relationship between
inequality and growth is predicted. The more modern view, however, predicts the opposite
effect on growth and this is via the aforementioned four channels—viz: endogenous fiscal22
policy; credit market imperfection and human capital accumulation; sociopolitical unrest
and instability; and endogenous fertility. The effects of income distribution on growth
through each of these channels are also tested for in the study, following the approach
recently being adopted in the empirical literature (e.g. Perotti, 1996 and Barro, 2000).
Effects of inequality on private saving and investment
The traditional view that high inequality promotes private saving and capital accumulation
is empirically examined by including the income distribution variables as regressors in the
equations for private domestic saving-GDP ratio and private investment-GDP ratio.12 The
results are presented in Tables 10 and 11 for private saving and private investment
equations, respectively.
12 Other regressors included are the initial level of per capita income (in logarithms) and average annual
inflation rate in the previous 5-years. Average 5-year annual terms of trade growth also features in the private
saving-GDP equations.23
Table 9
Effects of income inequality on economic growth—observations only for 1990s
Combined urban and rural income
distribution












































































































































































































2 .113 .133 .053 .092 .364 .314 .370 .383 .020 .051 .000 -.006
Number of observations 39 39 39 39 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the 5-year average per capita real GDP growth rate (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-
values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
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Generally, the coefficients of the income distribution variables are statistically insignificant
in the saving and investment equations. The only exception is the coefficient of the income
share of the poorest 40 percent that is modestly significant in the saving equation although
this has an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that high inequality reduces saving
(contrary to what the traditional view predicts). Thus, the existence of significant effects of
income distribution on growth through private saving and investment does not seem to
have been supported by the data. Barro (2000, Table 2) too reported that Gini coefficients
lack explanatory power in investment ratio equations estimated with a larger data set.
Table 10

























































Income share of the next




















2 .343 .348 .325 .339
Number of observations 53 53 53 53
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is private saving-GDP ratio. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the
parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate would be
statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.25
Table 11
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2 .359 .354 .380 .368
Number of obs. 57 57 57 57
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is private investment-GDP ratio. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below
the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate would
be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
Effects of inequality on fiscal policy—taxation and government spending
According to the more recent perception, high inequality is expected to trigger pressures
(e.g., by majority voters in a democratic setting) on the government to embark on
equalizing expenditures which would be financed (at least, partly) by raising more (and,
presumably, distortionary) taxes. By so doing, economic growth would be retarded.
Following Perotti (1996) and others, we test for this proposition by including income
distribution factors in the equations for government consumption expenditure and tax
equations and the results are as presented in Tables 12 and 13 respectively.13 The results of
the effects of income distribution on tax ratio show some difference, depending on whether
it is rural or urban income distribution pattern. Therefore, the results featuring rural and
urban income distribution patterns are also separately reported in Table 13, in addition to
those including economy-wide income distribution variables.
The coefficients of income distribution variables are all statistically insignificant in the
government consumption equations in Table 12, indicating absence of evidence that high
inequality triggers pressures that make the governments increase spending in these
countries. Also, the coefficients of economy-wide income distribution variables are
statistically insignificant in the Table 13 tax ratio equations (reported in the first 4 columns
13 Both of these dependent variables are expressed as percentage of GDP. The level of per capita income (in
logarithm) is the only other regressor in the equations. Government consumption expenditure is chosen in
preference to total government expenditure because of data availability and because populist pressures on the
government to raise spending is likely to affect government consumption than government investment
spending.26
of the Table) that are based on all usable data points. But when the economy-wide income
distribution is analyzed by rural and urban segments (as noted earlier, data are only
available for the 1990s), it is found (see last 8 columns of the Table) all the coefficients for
the rural and urban income distribution variables (with the exception of the share of the
urban area ‘middle class’) are statistically highly significant. While the parameter estimates
for the Gini coefficient inequality measure and the share of the richest 20 percent of the
population are negative, those of the other inequality measures are positive. Based on this
further analysis of rural and urban income distribution patterns, the evidence therefore is
that high inequality reduces the tax ratio, which again does not support (and, in fact,
actually contradicts) the proposition that high inequality leads to high tax ratio.
Table 12



























































2 -.011 -.013 -.006 -.007
Number of observations 63 63 63 63
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is government consumption-GDP ratio. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses
below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate
would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
Explanations for the above findings are not far-fetched. For instance, most of the countries
(at the income distribution observation periods) do not have democracies that would enable
voters to trigger the high inequality-induced populist pressures of the type being envisaged
so as to compel governments to embark on equalizing fiscal policies. In addition, as rightly
observed by Barro (2000: 7): ‘If more economic resources translate into correspondingly
greater political influence, then the positive link between inequality and redistribution need
not apply.’ It may be that this situation characterized many of the countries sampled in the
study so that the rich would be able to lobby the authorities against equalizing fiscal
actions. Most previous studies have similarly contradicted this endogenous fiscal policy
channel (e.g. Perotti, 1996).28
Table 13
Effects of income inequality on tax ratio—observations for 1990s only
Combined urban and rural income
distribution


























































































































































2 .336 .339 .331 .333 .298 .281 .303 .306 .229 .254 .201 .201
Number of observations 48 48 48 48 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is tax revenue-GDP ratio. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%,5 %a n d1 %
significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
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Inequality and credit market imperfection-induced human capital accumulation
As noted in section 2, it is claimed in the theoretical literature that, due to existence of
borrowing constraints in the credit markets, poor households are unable to finance
investments in education, even when such investments offer relatively high rates of return.
High inequality would increase the number of people affected by this credit market
constraint and, hence, would reduce economy-wide investment in education which, in turn,
should retard economic growth. Previous studies, like Perotti (1996), have tested this
proposition by including income distribution variables as regressors in equations for school
enrolment ratios and have reported education-retarding effect of high inequality. We
follow a similar approach in the present study. Specifically, we have estimated equations
for primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratios by including income
distribution variables as regressors (with the only other regressor being the level of per
capita income). The results are presented in Table 14—the first 4 columns, the next 4
columns and the last 4 columns for primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratio
equation estimates, respectively.
The coefficients of the income distribution variables are statistically very significant in all,
except in the equations for primary school enrolment ratios. While the parameter estimates
of Gini coefficient and the share of richest 20 percent of the population are negative, those
of the income shares of the poorest 40 percent and the ‘middle class’ are negative. This
evidence is very robust and also very much in line with the prediction. When compared
with higher-level education, that income distribution variables are not significant factors
in primary school education is also in line with expectation and an added support, since
primary education is generally free, highly government-subsidized or compulsory in many
of the sampled countries—unlike higher-level education.30
Table 14
Effects of income inequality on school enrolment ratios—all observations
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2 .386 .390 .377 .384 .413 .402 .424 .429 .380 .373 .386 .394
Number of obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variables are (the logarithm values of) primary school, secondary school and tertiary school enrolment ratios, respectively. (ii) The numbers in the
parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is




Effects of income inequality on political stability—observations for 1990s only
Combined urban and rural income
distribution
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2 .080 .081 .027 .072 .144 .158 .009 .106 .100 .125 .002 .066
Number of obs. 34 34 34 34 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the index of political stability. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, a parameter estimate would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
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Effects of inequality on political instability
The proposition is that high inequality perpetrates high rates of social and political unrest,
including political instability—which, in turn, tend to hinder economic growth. Perotti
(1996) included inequality variables in the index of sociopolitical instability equations for a
larger data set and reported the predicted positive effect. In the present study, we estimated
a similar relationship for the index of political stability (as opposed to instability), with
income distribution variables being the regressors (in addition to the level of per capita
income). The resulting estimates are as reported in Table 15. The estimates are for 1990s
only, as the cross-country data on political stability index are available for mid-1990s
(specifically, around 1997). The estimates with economy-wide income distribution
variables are reported in the first 4 columns. We also estimated the relationship by
substituting rural and urban income distribution variables for the economy-wide ones and
the results are those reported in the middle and last 4 columns respectively. These latter
results are presented to show the similarity of the findings with those based on economy-
wide income distribution data.
In all cases, the parameter estimates of Gini coefficients and the share of richest 20 percent
of the population are negative while those of the share of the poorest 40 percent and the
‘middle class’ are positive. While the coefficients of the share of ‘middle class’ are not
statistically significant, the coefficients of all others are. Thus, there is a robust and
consistent evidence that high inequality is associated with reduced political stability in
these countries.
Effects of inequality on fertility
As discussed in section 2, it has been posited that, by downgrading more people from
above ‘poverty trap’ to below the ‘poverty trap’ (where fertility is higher), high inequality
would raise the overall fertility rate which would, in turn, reduce economic growth. A way
of testing this proposition that we adopt in the study is to include income distribution
variables in a fertility rate equation, following Perotti (1996) who reported results that
support the proposition.14 The resulting estimates are presented in Table 16.
While the coefficients of the income distribution variables are only marginally significant
in the equations, their signs are as expected. Specifically, those of the Gini coefficient and
the income share of the richest 20 percent of the population are positive while those of the
shares of the poorest 40 percent and ‘middle class’ are negative. This provides some
evidence which, though not very strong, does suggest that high inequality has increased
fertility rate in these countries.
14 Other regressors included in the fertility equations are the level of per capita income and secondary school
enrolment ratio, both of which are supposed to (and actually do) feature with negative coefficients.32
Table 16
































































2 .531 .526 .531 .533
Number of observations 65 65 65 65
Source: as discussed in the text.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the (logarithm value of) fertility rate. (ii) The numbers in the parentheses
below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, a parameter estimate
would be statistically significant if its t-value is absolutely up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6 respectively.
7. Summary and conclusions
Given the recent reawakening of interest on the need to reduce inequality as a way of
fighting poverty in Africa, coupled with the dearth of previous empirical studies on
inequality based on data from the region, the present study analyses income inequality
within African regional context. Quasi-panel data for 35 countries over different periods
during 1960s to 1990s were employed and the two complementary issues on income
inequality that have attracted attention in the empirical literature and in policy circles were
covered. These two issues are identification of factors that determine income inequality
and whether the effects of high inequality on economic growth is negative or positive,
including the channels through which those effects are brought about.
Our methodology on the former centres primarily on specification of a series of regression
equations for various income inequality measures to identify the effects, if any, of those
factors (i.e., explanatory variables) tested for. The methodology adopted in respect of the
latter, on the other hand, consists of featuring the income distribution factors as arguments
in economic growth equations (to determine their effects on growth) and in the equations
for other variables that are proxies for the possible channels of effects on growth. These
variables are private saving ratio and private investment ratio (both proxying the traditional
channel), government consumption-GDP ratio and tax ratio (both acting as proxies for
endogenous fiscal policy channel), school enrolment ratios (proxies for credit market
imperfection-induced human capital accumulation channel), political stability index (proxy
for sociopolitical instability channel), and fertility rate (proxy for endogenous fertility33
channel). In all cases, the income distribution variables considered are the Gini coefficient
and the income share of richest 20 percent of the population (high values of both of which
signifies high inequality) as well as the income share of the poorest 20 percent of the
population (a high value of which signifies low inequality) and the income share of the
next 40 percent ( that corresponds to the income share of the ‘middle class’).
The above relationships were estimated and the highlights of our findings are as follows:
On determinants of income distribution
· The level of economic development (or per capita income) attained is found to have
exerted inequalizing effect. The popular Kuznets’s effect (whereby the level of
development exerts inequalizing effect only in the early stage of development and
equalizing effect at a latter stage) is not detected, possibly because most (or probably
all) of the countries were yet to attain this latter stage of development during the
sampled periods.
· Regional factors too were found to have exert some influence in the sense that
inequality was generally higher in southern and eastern African countries, with the
reverse being the case in the northern African countries.
· The overall size of the government (as measured by government budget in relation to
GDP) is observed to have had inequalizing effect while the reverse is the case with the
size of government subsidies and transfers (in relation to both the overall budget and
the GDP).
· No perceptible effect of inflation rate on income distribution is recorded. However, the
phase of economic cycle is found to have exerted a reckonable effect, with the rising
phase of the cycle having equalizing effect and declining phase (i.e., during an
economic slump), inequalizing effect. This suggests the need for more forceful
implementation of poverty alleviation policies at the onset of an economic recession
(e.g., that sometimes characterizes the initial phase of economic reform policies) as the
poor are found to be disproportionately more vulnerable than the rich during such
periods.
· No remarkable effect of anti-corruption measures on income distribution except that it
appears to have reduced the income share of the ‘middle class’, possibly because this
was the class profiting mostly from the type of corruption being checked.
· International openness of the economy is found to have had no effect on income
distribution, allaying the popular fear that have been raised in anti-globalization circles
to the effect that globalization would aggravate the existing inequalities.
· High proportion of labour force being engaged in agricultural sector is found to have
inequalizing effect.
· Human and natural resources endowment are also found to have shaped the observed
pattern of income distribution in the countries. While a lack of skilled manpower (as
measured by illiteracy rate) had inequalizing effect, abundance of land resources (i.e.,
arable land per capita) too is, ‘paradoxically’, found to have the same effect.34
On the effects of income inequality on economic growth
· Though the evidence is not very robust, there is the overall impression that high
inequality hindered economic growth in the countries during the sampled period.
On the channels of effect of inequality on economic growth
· No evidence supporting the traditional channel that inequality reduces private saving
and investment (and, hence, economic growth) is detected.
· Similarly, no evidence supporting the endogenous fiscal policy (or political economy)
channel that high inequality increases distributive or equalizing government spending,
financed by an increase in (distortionary and growth-reducing) taxes is spotted. This is
not too surprising as the sampled countries were not having democracies that would
have ‘coerced’ the government to accede to the majority voters.
· There is a very strong and robust evidence in support of the credit market
imperfection-induced human capital channel. Specifically, high inequality is found to
have reduced both secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratios (and little, if any,
effect on primary school enrolment ratio), as the operation of this channel would
require.
· Similarly, there is a very strong and robust evidence in support of sociopolitical
instability channel. This is because high inequality is found to have been negatively
associated with political stability (and, hence, positively associated with instability) in
the countries.
· Finally, there is also evidence supporting the endogenous fertility channel as high
inequality is found to have increased fertility rate in the countries.
The above findings are based on statistics, the quality of which is far from being perfect.
This constitutes a risk factor inherent in the above results and their interpretations, which
should therefore be taken with due caution. It is hoped that more reliable income
distribution and related statistics would become available in the not-too-distant future so as
to permit more reliable estimates. Meanwhile, it is also hoped that the findings of the
present study have shed some light on those issues addressed and, hence, would provide
some basis for income distribution-related policies for the countries.
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